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**DEC 08 2004**

In re Application of :  
Ming C. Hao et al :  
Application No. 09/847,390 :  
Filed: May 2, 2001 :  
Attorney Docket No. 10003407-1 :

**OFFICE OF PETITIONS**

**ON PETITION**

This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a), filed October 19, 2004, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition is **DISMISSED**.

Any request for reconsideration of this decision must be submitted within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision. Extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The reconsideration request should include a cover letter entitled "Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)." This is **not** a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.

The above-identified application became abandoned for failure to reply within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.113 in a timely manner to the final Office action mailed December 30, 2003, which set a shortened statutory period for reply of three (3) months. A reply under 37 CFR 1.113 is limited to an amendment that *prima facie* places the application in condition for allowance or a Notice of Appeal (and appeal fee required by 37 CFR 1.17(b)). The reply submitted on March 8, 2003 did not *prima facie* place the application in condition for allowance as noted in the Advisory Action mailed September 15, 2004. Therefore, as no Notice of Appeal (and appeal fee), Request for Continued Examination (RCE) or a continuing application was timely filed, and no extension of time under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a) were obtained, the above-identified application became abandoned on March 31, 2004.

A grantable petition to revive an abandoned application under 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply (unless previously filed), which may be met by the filing of a continuing application in a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, but must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof in an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof; (2) the petition fee required by 37 CFR 1.17(l); (3) an adequate showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) was unavoidable; and (4) a terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) for an application filed prior to June 8, 1995. This petition lacks item (3).

The showing of record is not sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the delay was unavoidable within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 133 and 37 CFR 1.137(a). See MPEP 711(c)(III)(c)(2) for a discussion of the requirements for a showing of unavoidable delay.

As to item (3), petitioner asserts that the delay was unavoidable due to the mailing of the Advisory Action beyond the six month statutory period for response.

Decisions on reviving abandoned applications on the basis of “unavoidable” delay have adopted the reasonably prudent person standard in determining if the delay was unavoidable:

The word ‘unavoidable’ . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present.

In re Mattullah, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912)(quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913). In addition, decisions on revival are made on a “case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account.” Smith v. Mossinghoff 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 USPQ 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Finally, a petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was “unavoidable.” Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316-17, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1131-32 (N.D. Ind. 1987).

As petitioner was advised in the Advisory Action of September 15, 2004, the amendment of March 8, 2004, did not place this application in *prima facie* condition for allowance. As the amendment did not place the application in *prima facie* condition for allowance, it is the petitioner’s responsibility to take appropriate action to save the application from abandonment. Therefore, whether petitioner received an Advisory Action or not prior to the expiration of the six month statutory period, the only right petitioner was entitled to was that of appealing the final rejection or by filing a continuing application. Put simply, in an application subject to a final Office action, it is the petitioner’s responsibility to timely file a Notice of Appeal (and fee) to avoid the abandonment of the application (or continuing application), unless the petitioner is informed in writing that the application is allowed prior to the expiration of the period for response to the final Office action. 37 CFR 1.116(b) clearly states that:

“The admission of, or refusal to admit, any amendment after a final rejection, a final action, an action closing prosecution, or any related proceedings will not operate to relieve the application ...from its condition as subject to appeal or to save the application from abandonment under § 1.135....”

As such, the abandonment of an application subject to a final Office action is not “unavoidable” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 133 and 37 CFR 1.137(a) where an applicant simply permits the maximum extendable statutory period for response to a final Office action to expire while awaiting a Notice of Allowance or other communication. However, delay resulting from a lack of knowledge of, or the failure to properly apply, the regulations and procedures before the Office is not unavoidable delay.

While the showing of record is not sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the delay was unavoidable, petitioner is not precluded from obtaining relief by filing a petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) on the basis of unintentional delay. A grantable petition pursuant to

37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by (1) the reply required to the outstanding Office action or notice, unless previously filed; (2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(m); (3) a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unintentional. The Commissioner may require additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional; and (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.

The filing of a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) cannot be intentionally delayed and therefore must be filed promptly. A person seeking revival due to unintentional delay can not make a statement that the delay was unintentional unless the entire delay, including the delay from the date it was discovered that the application was abandoned until the filing of the petition to revive under 37 CFR 1.137(b), was unintentional. A statement that the delay was unintentional is not appropriate if petitioner intentionally delayed the filing of a petition for revival under 37 CFR 1.137(b).

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

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Telephone inquiries concerning this decision should be directed to Wan Laymon at (571) 272-3220.

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